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It is my pleasure to bring you the third issue of the year, with
all its articles and features. This issue also contains an an-
nouncement of the eighth IMR Doctoral Conference (IMRDC)
scheduled on January 11 and 12, 201 7. I look forward to your
participation in IMRDC 2016–2017.
Banks play an important role in the education of skilled
professionals by providing education loans for higher educa-
tion. However, the level of credit risk in education loans has
been very high in recent years. In the paper “Studying Bor-
rower Level Risk Characteristics of Education Loan in India”,
Professor Arindam Bandyopadhyay uses borrower level data
of a cross-section of 5000 borrowers, randomly selected, from
four major public sector banks in India, to study the micro-
level risk of education loan and identify key risk factors of
such loans across various geographies and constitutions. The
paper examines education loan default risk using logistic re-
gression and loss given default using Tobit censored regres-
sion in a multivariate analysis framework. The ﬁndings are
that borrower defaults on education loan payments are mainly
inﬂuenced by security, borrower margin, and repayment
periods. The likelihood of default is lower if the loan is secured
and the borrower’s own contribution is higher. The socio-
economic characteristics of borrowers and their regional lo-
cations also act as important factors in education loan
defaults. As regarding loss given default, the study ﬁndings
are that smaller defaulted outstanding loans have better
chances of loan recovery; the presence of guarantor/co-
borrower and collateral security increases the chances of loan
recovery; the longer the repayment period, the lower is the
loss rate. The study also suggests measures to reduce risk in
education loans that includes strengthening credit risk as-
sessment techniques as one of the factors. By segmenting bor-
rowers by probability of default and loss given default, banks
can adopt better risk mitigation and pricing strategy to resolve
borrower problems.
In their paper “Subordinate Debt, Deposit Insurance and
Market Oriented Monitoring of Banks”, Professor Gaurav Singh
Chauhan and co-author Dr. Satyam S. Sundaram present a
model of a bank with endogenous risk choices, where del-
egated monitoring by an active market in subordinate debt
helps to contain risk shifting by banks in the presence of
deposit insurance. When banks with risk shifting proclivities
operating in a closely interconnected bank system face li-
quidity pressures and solvency threats from information based
bank runs by unsophisticated depositors, they threaten the
systemic stability by sucking up the liquidity from the system,
given that banks can choose a level of risk that is socially
suboptimal. In this context, according to the extant litera-
ture, deposit insurance by government backed agents could
be the remedy. However, government backed agents are
not well equipped to estimate the risk sensitivity, and hence,
risk based premiums. Further even with deposit insurance,
the issue of risk shifting incentives of banks still remains
unresolved. In such a situation, greater participation from
market forces, in the form of provision of subordinate debt,
and an active market of subordinate debt to delegate the
monitoring of the risk shifting incentives of banks is war-
ranted to contain the risk shifting incentives of banks. The
model in this paper builds on past studies and envisages an
active market for subordinate debt which can continuously
impart signals to the regulators and other at-risk stakehold-
ers. This provides the necessary discipline for banks so that
they may conform to solvency consistent behaviour. Such
active monitoring leads to better allocation of risk by a
bank and provides endogenous incentives to do so. The model
also depicts the relevance of subordinate debt in eliminat-
ing the distortions in deposit insurance pricing. The paper
argues that active monitoring by subordinate debt can induce
incentives for counter-cyclical asset allocation by banks for
their risky portfolios. The model leads banks to choose risk
levels consistent with the ﬁrst best as envisaged by social
planners.
On reviewing the empirical research on idiosyncratic vola-
tility, Professors Sanjay Sehgal and Vidisha Garg observe that
there is no consensus on the relationship between idiosyn-
cratic volatility and asset returns. They also observe that the
role of cross-sectional higher order moments in predicting
returns as well as forming proﬁtable portfolio strategies is rela-
tively unexplored, and that literature has focussed mainly on
mature markets. In their paper “Cross Sectional Moments and
Portfolio Returns: Evidence for Select Emerging Markets”, they
attempt to ﬁll these research gaps using emerging market data
from BRIICKS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia,
China, South Korea, and South Africa), using cross-sectional
variance of stock returns (CSV) as a measure of idiosyn-
cratic risk, which has the advantage of being calculated at
any frequency. Speciﬁcally, their objectives are to estimate
non-model and model based measures of idiosyncratic risk and
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check their degree of association; to assess the return pre-
dictability power of CSV and higher order moments, i.e. cross-
sectional skewness (CSS) and cross-sectional kurtosis (CSK);
to investigate if more proﬁtable portfolios can be formed by
using the information contained in the cross-sectional higher
order moments vis-a-vis cross-sectional variance; and to check
whether the returns on these portfolios can be explained by
asset pricing models like CAPM and the Fama French (FF)
model. They develop testable hypotheses accordingly. The
data for the study is from the Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Results show that, consistent with prior literature, the CSV
measure is highly correlated with alternative measures con-
structed as variance of errors from the CAPM and the FF three
factor models. CSV has a signiﬁcant positive relationship with
market returns only in some sample countries. The relation-
ship of CSS and CSK with future market returns is normally
positive; the results are stronger for the daily data com-
pared to the monthly data. Results show no consistent rela-
tionship between CSV sensitivity and portfolio returns, as also
with CSK sensitivity sorted portfolios. More consistent results
are obtained for CSS measure. Asset pricing models satisfac-
torily explain portfolio returns with some exceptions. On risk
adjusted basis, among the sample countries, South Africa
offers the most proﬁtable trading strategy based on CSS sorted
portfolios. The study provides important implications for in-
vestment managers as well as researchers.
The relationship between executive pay and ﬁrm perfor-
mance has been widely studied in the corporate gover-
nance literature. Of late, the academic literature on agency
theory and executive compensation has argued that CEO com-
pensation should be aligned to ﬁrm performance. Profes-
sors Mehul Raithatha and Surenderrao Komera in their paper
“Executive Compensation and Firm Performance: Evidence
from Indian Firms”, contribute to the literature by (i) exam-
ining the pay–performance relationship using the PROWESS
database for the period 2002–2012 when disclosure of ex-
ecutive compensation became mandatory for Indian ﬁrms,
(ii) examining emerging markets while extant literature fo-
cussed on Anglo-Saxon economies, and (iii) discussing the
effect of persistence in executive compensation practices.
After excluding all the ﬁnancial services ﬁrms, ﬁrms con-
trolled by the state, and joint sector ﬁrms, the ﬁnal sample
consisted of 21,834 ﬁrm year observations, consisting of 3100
ﬁrms with an average of 7.04 years each. Of the sample ﬁrms,
36.37% were business group afﬁliated ﬁrms, and the remain-
ing 63.63% were standalone ﬁrms. The study considers con-
solidated executive compensation as the proxy for pay, and
both accounting measures (return on equity and return on
assets) as well as the market performance measures (Tobin’s
Q and annual stock return) to study ﬁrm performance. Further,
the study considers ﬁrm speciﬁc variables such as size,
leverage, and risk. The study attempts to empirically validate
the heterogeneity in the magnitude of pay–performance re-
lationship by classifying the observations according to the ﬁrm
size and type of ownership. The study reports signiﬁcant per-
sistence in executive compensation among the sample ﬁrms,
even among the sub-samples of ﬁrms, classiﬁed on size and
ownership. Findings also suggest the existence of signiﬁ-
cant pay–performance relationship among the sample ﬁrms.
However, this is not the case when performance is mea-
sured using market based measures, leading to an argument
that sample ﬁrms determine their executive compensation
based on accounting measures. The pay–performance rela-
tionship was absent among the business group afﬁliated ﬁrms,
whereas their standalone counterparts reported signiﬁcant
pay–performance relationship. The study also ﬁnds that the
pay–performance relationship is absent among small sample
ﬁrms, but the relationship is signiﬁcant among larger sample
ﬁrms. The authors attribute the contrast in their observa-
tion to the underdeveloped nature of institutional mecha-
nisms and weak investor activism in India.
The Round Table in this issue is on “India Emerging: New
Financial Architecture”, with an Academic Note by Profes-
sor Sankarshan Basu of IIMB which ﬁrst lays out the funda-
mental challenges to the global ﬁnancial system that were
brought about by the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008. The
note then delineates the form of the new ﬁnancial architec-
ture that India needs to build, given its requirements, to deal
with the demand for larger levels of deregulation of its
markets, and the high growth rate of 8%–9% to sustain the
economy. The new ﬁnancial architecture would need to in-
tegrate the banking sector, the mutual funds sector, the non-
banking ﬁnance sector, and organisations that collate and
provide relevant ﬁnancial information, channelised toward
risk management and risk mitigation in particular. The chal-
lenges of building the new ﬁnancial architecture is dis-
cussed by a panel of eminent senior practitioners from the
different ﬁelds. The panel comprises Mr. T Keshav Kumar,
Chief General Manager, Commercial Banking, State Bank of
Mysore; Mr. Imtaiyazur Rahman, Chief Financial Ofﬁcer, UTI
Mutual Fund; Mr. Sriram Ramnarayan, Country Head, Finan-
cial Markets, Thomson Reuters; and Mr. G.S. Sundararajan,
Group Director, Shriram Group. The panel discussion is chaired
by Professor R. Vaidyanathan of IIM Bangalore.
This issue carries a book review by Kshitij Awasthi, doc-
toral student at IIM Bangalore, of “Who Cheats and How?
Scams, Fraud and the Dark Side of the Corporate World” by
Robin Banerjee, 2015, Sage Publications, New Delhi.
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